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Articles 
Judicial Independence: Origins and 
Contemporary Challenges* 
David J. Barron** 
I want to thank Chief Judge Smith and Judge McConnell for 
inviting me to speak to you at this conference.  The theme that you 
have chosen—independence and the courts—is always an 
attractive one for a judge to talk about.  For one thing, there are not 
many judges who have to think very hard about whether they are 
for it.  For another, there are not that many topics that such judges 
can talk about publicly, and this is one of them.  It is hard to go 
wrong—especially if you defend judicial independence, which I plan 
to do. But, beyond self-interest, judicial independence is an 
important topic in its own right, and now more than ever.  And so, 
I am pleased to offer some reflections about the origins of this idea 
in our constitutional system and some of the contemporary 
challenges to it.   
The challenges to judicial independence at present are, as you 
all know, quite real.  At certain moments, concerns about judicial 
independence do become more salient than in others—not only here 
in our country but also globally.  And it is quite evident that this 
issue has become salient in constitutional democracies the world 
over.  The salience of this issue may be attributed at present to the 
* Text of speech delivered on October 18, 2019 at the 2019 District
Conference of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. 
 **  Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
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increasing political and cultural divisions within Western 
democracies—for a polarized politics is sure to put pressure on the 
independence of a court system.  The contentious nature of the 
questions that such a polarized politics is certain to bring to courts 
is one contributing factor.  So, too, though, is the nature of political 
polarization itself.   
Such polarization, once it takes root, feeds on, even as it 
generates, great suspicion (not always unjustified) of any 
institutions—whether they be scientific academies, university 
faculties, media outlets, or courts—that purport to stand outside 
the polarization and to be committed not to either side in the 
struggle of the moment but to something more timeless—call it the 
scientific method, academic values, journalistic obligations, or the 
demands of the law.  For as critical as neutral institutions are to a 
free society, they are also—especially in a free society—sure to be 
objects of suspicion when that society finds itself sharply divided in 
its politics.  And when the institution that claims to be guided by 
such above-the-fray neutrality is, by design, immunized from post-
hoc electoral accountability, as federal judges uniquely are, then 
that suspicion, heightened by court rulings on contentious matters, 
will, unsurprisingly, take aim at more than the asserted illogic of 
this or that judicial ruling.   
That suspicion will spark calls for more than the need to correct 
legislatively or by constitutional amendment the result of this or 
that ruling in a specific case.  Instead, such outcome-fueled 
suspicion will inevitably take aim at the very independence of that 
unaccountable but self-professedly neutral institution, in gross. 
And when this happens, the problem comes to be seen not merely 
as one that concerns how an independent judiciary has chosen to 
decide a particular case.  The problem comes to be seen as one that 
concerns whether the judiciary that was permitted to decide a case 
of that magnitude at all should be allowed to remain so independent 
or, relatedly, whether it is deciding things with the kind of 
independence of mind that should be expected of those given such 
unaccountable authority.  There comes to be a loss of faith, in other 
words, that the decisions the judiciary produces are anything other 
than the expression of one side of the polarized debate that defines 
the nation’s politics more broadly.  
There is, we should take solace, nothing new in this dynamic. 
It was present soon after the founding in the transition from 
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President Adams to President Jefferson.  It was true during the 
Reconstruction period when the size of the Supreme Court was 
adjusted time and again.  It was true during the New Deal, with 
the failed effort at court-packing.  And it was true during the height 
of the Warren Court, with the spate of efforts to strip the federal 
courts of jurisdiction over a host of matters and even to impeach 
certain justices, the chief justice among the targets.  We are, it 
turns out, pretty good at forgetting unpleasant aspects of our 
history that might lead us to doubt just how strong our commitment 
to an ideal really is.  And thus, despite this past, in which 
challenges to the independence of the federal courts have been more 
than occasional, there has not been a wholesale loss of appreciation 
of the ideal of judicial independence.   
Judicial independence is an ideal that runs deep in the nation’s 
understanding of itself, so much so that it is hard to think of our 
constitutional democracy without picturing judges—independent 
judges—as being just as foundational to it as members of Congress 
or presidents.  It is, in other words, foundational to our own 
understanding of what our democracy is that there might be 
matters of great consequence—whether they concern racial justice, 
as in Brown,1 or executive authority, as in the Nixon Tapes case2 or 
the Steel Seizure case3—that properly will be decided in a forum 
that is removed from direct political control and that derives its 
legitimacy in resolving such questions in large part from the sense 
that its independence permits it to exhibit a degree of neutrality, 
expressed in the grammar of law, and subject to its demands, that 
the contentious politics of the moment cannot.   
To make the point that the need for independence was 
anticipated from the very start, even though it was hardly a 
standard practice at the time, I thought I would begin with a story 
from Rhode Island.  It is not a contemporary story.  It is, though, an 
instructive one.  I think it helps to remind us of just what the point 
of judicial independence is, how durable an idea it has proven to be, 
and what we might do, if we would wish for it to endure, to shore it 
up.   
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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The story takes place in 1786.  The Rhode Island General 
Assembly had just passed a series of laws that required merchants 
to accept paper money in the same manner that they would accept 
gold or silver.4  These laws were harsh.  They subjected merchants 
who failed to comply with them to criminal prosecution within three 
days in a special court in which there would be no right to a jury. 
These laws were also the product of a contentious political debate 
within the state and one that was playing out across the fledgling 
nation as a whole.  These laws were part of what the Federalists—
who, as you know, advocated strongly for the kind of independent 
federal judiciary codified in Article III of the Constitution—would 
soon be derisively calling the “rage for paper money.”5  This “rage” 
reflected a desire on the part of the people themselves, as expressed 
through their state legislatures, to ease the burden on those lower 
down the economic chain.  There was, after all, a reason why Rhode 
Island would not even send a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia.  Its political representatives had a 
pretty good idea which direction that convention was likely to go 
when it came to concerns such as those that had animated the 
passage of these pro-paper-money measures. 
The story picks up next in September of that year.  At the time, 
a Rhode Islander named John Trevett attempted to purchase meat 
from John Weeden, who owned a butcher shop in Newport. 
Weeden, as it happened, refused Trevett’s paper money as payment 
for his order.  In response, Trevett took out an information against 
Weeden for the crime of refusing that type of currency.6  Weeden 
was represented in the case that followed by James Mitchell 
Varnum, who had served as a general in the Continental Army and 
who had attended the Continental Congress on behalf of Rhode 
Island.  At the ensuing criminal trial, Varnum argued that the law 
authorizing the court to hear the case was unconstitutional, as he 
contended that it infringed on Weeden’s right to have his case heard 
in front of a jury.  Rhode Island did not have a written constitution 
in 1786.  But, Varnum dismissed this inconvenient fact, arguing, 
4. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 455, 476 (2005).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Henry Dawson ed.,
1863). 
6. Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 79 (2003). 
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“Constitution!  We have none: Who dares to say that?  None but a 
British emissary, or a traitor to his country.”7  He thus argued that 
the right to trial by jury was fundamental, pointing to various 
sources, including natural law. This argument—it bears 
emphasizing—was being pressed more than a decade before 
Marbury v. Madison.8  That was the case, of course, in which Chief 
Justice Marshall established judicial review by federal courts of the 
constitutionality of legislation. 
But, Varnum was no legal slouch, and so he elegantly made the 
case for judicial review before Chief Justice Marshall had occasion 
to do so.  He contended that “[t]he Judiciary have the sole power of 
judging of those laws [passed by the legislature], and are bound to 
execute them; but cannot admit any act of the Legislature as law, 
which is against the constitution.”9  Indeed, so pleased was Varnum 
with his argument that, as Dean William Treanor from Georgetown 
notes, he published this early argument for judicial review in 
pamphlet form and even appeared at the Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia to offer it for sale.  (Shouldn’t he have passed it out 
for free?)  But, in making this case, Varnum realized it was also 
necessary to make the case for judicial independence—which he 
figured even then had more popular appeal than did judicial review 
itself.  And so he argued that judicial review was necessary because 
judicial “[s]ervility” to the legislature “would render [the courts] 
totally subservient to the will of their masters, and the people must 
be enslaved or fly to arms.”10  The next day, the court announced 
its decision, preventing the case against Weeden from proceeding. 
Three of the judges explained that the act requiring the jury-less 
criminal trial was “unconstitutional,” but only one provided an 
explanation, stating that it was unconstitutional to impose 
penalties without a jury trial.  Another judge merely stated that he 
“voted against taking cognizance,” while the fifth judge offered no 
7. Treanor, supra note 4, at 477 (quoting James M. Varnum, The Case,
Trevett v. Weeden, in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417, 421 (1971)). 
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. Treanor, supra note 4, at 477 (quoting Varnum, supra note 7, at 423).
10. B. Mitchell Simpson III, The Case of Trevett v. Weeden, R.I. B.J. May–
June 2017, at 7 (quoting Varnum, supra note 7, at 422). 
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explanation at all.11  And with that, one of the models for Marbury 
was in place. 
But the Rhode Island General Assembly was hardly done with 
the matter.  It quickly summoned the five judges on the court to 
appear before them to explain their decision.  On two occasions that 
fall, three judges did appear before the General Assembly—at one 
appearance, represented by Varnum—to justify their actions.  The 
judges did not provide significant additional explanation for their 
decision, however, and the General Assembly passed a resolution 
expressing its dissatisfaction with this lack of explanation. 
Nevertheless, the General Assembly determined that, because the 
judges had not committed a criminal offense, they could not be 
removed, and they were discharged from attending additional 
meetings of the General Assembly. 
But lest it seem that judicial independence passed this early 
test—the story ends this way.  In May of 1787, it turns out, just as 
the delegates were meeting in Philadelphia to begin drafting what 
would become the federal Constitution’s guarantee of judicial 
independence for the federal judiciary, the General Assembly had 
occasion to appoint judges for their annual terms—there being no 
life tenure in Rhode Island for judges at the time.  And, as it 
happened, four out of the five judges who decided Trevett v. Weeden 
were not reappointed to their posts.  I am guessing you have an idea 
about the one who was reappointed: he was the only one of the five 
who had not offered an explanation for his vote.  Perhaps this was 
a coincidence.  Perhaps not.  
It is remarkable, then, that the federal Constitutional 
Convention—and eventually, the people of the various states 
through the ratification process—made Article III part of the 
Constitution, with the strong form of independence that it supplies. 
But, the delegates to the convention in Philadelphia—and 
eventually, the people then voting in ratifying constitutions—were 
of the view that Varnum basically had it right.  Judges could not be 
made to be servile political actors.  They needed to be able to act 
neutrally—and that meant both that they needed to be protected 
from direct political control, so long as they exhibited good 
behavior—and that they needed to be empowered to, in 
consequence of their independence, safeguard certain basic rights 
11. Treanor, supra note 4, at 478.
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that politics might in the moment fail to respect.  After all, the 
Declaration of Independence had asserted that one of the crimes of 
the King was precisely that he had not respected the independence 
of judges.  The King “has made [j]udges dependent on his [w]ill 
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment 
of their salaries,” Jefferson wrote in that document.12 
This brief story from our past is instructive along a number of 
dimensions.  In particular, it helps us to see different components 
of judicial independence, each of which is critical.  When we talk 
about judicial independence, after all, we could be talking about at 
least two different things.  We could be talking, first, about what is 
sometimes called branch independence.  Or we could be talking 
about what is sometimes called decisional independence.  Let me 
start with the first idea of judicial independence before closing with 
some thoughts about the second kind. 
With regard to branch independence, the focus is not on 
whether any particular decision was made independently.  The 
focus is on whether the judiciary has been set up in a way that 
permits its decisions to be made independently.  The fact that 
federal judges have life tenure during good behavior is one way that 
we have set up the federal judiciary to ensure that is the case.  We 
are not at risk of losing our jobs merely because of the rulings that 
we issue.  That was not true of the judges in Trevett v. Weeden.  They 
were at such risk, precisely because they had only one-year 
appointments and thus were effectively subjected to annual 
performance reviews.  The fact that federal judicial salaries may 
not be diminished—as Article III provides—is another way in which 
the independence of the branch is protected.  Just as the prospect 
of being fired would infringe the independent decision-making 
capacity, so too would the prospect of a pay cut. 
But there are other features of judicial independence that are 
perhaps less front and center.  The separation of powers, whereby 
the judicial power is made distinct from the legislature and the 
executive power, is itself a means of securing the independence of 
the judicial branch.  It is the means by which federal judges may 
ensure that the core of their work is not simply transferred to a 
separate set of decision makers less independent from political 
controls so that those actors, rather than independent judges, may 
12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
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decide them.  It is also a means by which judges may insulate 
themselves from being drawn into political controversies 
unnecessarily.  By giving federal judges the power to hear only 
cases or controversies, they may not be made to render opinions on 
the contentious matters of the day outside the context of actual 
disputes.  
But, of course, insofar as the separation of powers is itself in 
this way a means of securing judicial independence, judicial 
review—which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution—
becomes a critical means by which this aspect of judicial 
independence is protected.  Through judicial review, the federal 
judiciary gets to determine whether an effort to move a case to 
administrative judges, not protected by life tenure, is permissible 
under the Constitution.  Similarly, more targeted legislative or 
executive efforts to strip federal judges of their jurisdiction to decide 
certain classes of cases—whether concerning busing or school 
prayer or the death penalty—must be reviewed by the federal 
judges themselves to ensure that they comply with the 
constitutional presuppositions about the kind of work that federal 
judges protected by Article III must decide.  Nor, for that matter, 
may judicial judgments be reopened without federal judges—by 
virtue of their power of judicial review—first having a chance to 
pass on whether such reopening would comport with the separation 
of powers.  In this respect, then, Varnum was onto something very 
powerful in linking judicial review and judicial independence.  The 
way that the branch has been set up ensures that it is not “servile” 
to political actors.  But, to ensure that it remains that way—and 
thus that such paper protections on independence are respected—
federal judges themselves are, through judicial review, enabled to 
enforce those protections of their own independence. 
 Of course, to describe these features of the independence of the 
judicial branch is to acknowledge how much it still depends on 
norms and customs, more than parchment barriers.  There is an 
established sense about the wrongfulness of using the 
impeachment clause as an end run around the good behavior 
protection set forth in Article III.  There is a recognition of the 
legitimacy of judicial review that commands compliance by 
executive branch actors, even though judges have no real practical 
means of ensuring such compliance. 
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At the present time, as best I can tell, the challenge to judicial 
independence does not take the form of a challenge to these key 
attributes of the independence of the branch.  There are the 
occasional academic challenges to judicial review, but the fights at 
the moment concern much more how such review should be 
exercised rather than whether it should be.  Similarly, although 
there are questions about whether federal judges should be able to 
retain their jobs for life, there is no real suggestion that I have seen 
that they should not be permitted to serve during their tenures so 
long as they exhibit good behavior.  Nor thankfully, has there been 
a push to diminish judicial salaries—not that there has been much 
of an effort to raise them.  I observe as well that the jurisdiction-
stripping efforts that were so present in the 1960s and ‘70s—and 
that now and again reappear—also have been few and far between 
of late.  In these respects, there would seem to be a strong case for 
concluding that the independence of the branch is strong.  And yet, 
there are reasons not to be too confident even when it comes to the 
independence of the branch itself.  
There have been proposals to increase the size of the federal 
judiciary—both in the courts of appeal and at the Supreme Court—
that some have seen as, in effect, efforts to make an end run around 
Article III’s guarantees of branch independence.  For, while such 
proposals would not seek the removal of judges due to disagreement 
with their rulings, they are—sometimes expressly—aimed at 
effectively replacing them due to disagreement with their rulings. 
It is as if in Trevett v. Weeden, rather than declining to reappoint 
the four judges who dared to explain their reasons for ruling as they 
did in that case, the legislature instead chose to reappoint the same 
five judges but then to also add six new judges who it was confident 
would vote to overrule that prior decision the first chance that they 
had.  
There are other, more subtle, ways in which the independence 
of the branch might be thought to be under pressure.  There were 
times—in the not too distant past—when the process for selecting 
federal judges appeared to reflect what we might think of as a much 
greater faith in the ideal of judicial independence.  The notion that 
litmus tests were not proper in deciding whom should be appointed 
was a reflection of that notion.  The regularity with which 
appointments could be made unanimously or with near unanimity 
was a reflection of that popular faith as well.  But the norms 
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underlying the notion that litmus tests are improper, that there is 
such a thing as “qualifications” that could be neutrally considered, 
are ones that, any fair observer would have to acknowledge, are up 
for debate in ways that were not always the case.  For if there were 
always exceptions to the norm that eschewed litmus tests or that 
took the notion that qualifications could be divorced from political 
allegiance at face value, one wonders if the exceptions are becoming 
the rule.  
There is, however, another sense of judicial independence that 
we might have in mind.  Here, the focus is less on the independence 
of the branch than on the decisional independence of the judges. 
The notion here is that each judge must decide a case impartially 
and, as Archibald Cox once put it, “according to law” and not on the 
basis of political allegiances.13  Branch independence certainly is a 
key means by which this is ensured.  That federal judges may not 
be removed for how they rule—and only for serious misconduct—is 
a critical means of ensuring that each judge will decide a case 
impartially.  But those protections only provide space to exercise 
independent judgment.  They cannot themselves guarantee that the 
judges themselves will exhibit it.  That is up to the judges. 
As is often the case in periods of intense political polarization, 
it must be admitted that the belief that, in consequence of this 
structural independence, judges do in fact decide cases 
independently is being daily challenged.  The sense that federal 
judges are not deciding cases, to repeat Cox’s phrase, “according to 
law”—that their decisions are instead reflective of something more 
like, if not partisan politics, than at least political ideology—has 
taken hold of late.  It is reflected in the nature of the challenges to 
the legitimacy of judicial decisions in contentious cases that are 
being rendered.  That the Chief Justice of the United States 
recently weighed in to assure the public that the federal judiciary 
does not understand itself to be comprised of Obama judges or 
Trump judges14 is an indication of the concern that such challenges 
to the belief that judges are in fact deciding cases independently 
were gaining some traction.  Or, at least, it is an indication that the 
13. ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968).
14. Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap over
Judges, AP NEWS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://apnews.com/c4b34f9639e 
141069c08cf1e3deb6b84 [https://perma.cc/K5B2-9NSN].  
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legitimacy of the federal judiciary depends on the public believing 
that what federal judges do is distinct from what the other branches 
do and that this is not a moment to be complacent about whether 
the public will continue to believe as much. 
I think this sense of judicial independence—that judges are 
actually deciding cases independently, in the strongest sense of that 
word—is the one that is under the greatest pressure at the moment. 
And the question thus becomes, what is to be done about it?  The 
most obvious thing that judges can do is to make sure that they are 
in fact living up to that ideal in the way they approach their cases 
and decide them.  And the most obvious way to communicate to the 
public that they are doing just that is through the opinions that 
they issue—in their tone and substance, in the quality of their 
reasoning and their fair treatment of competing arguments, in their 
accounting for precedent and the record.  Are the decisions 
exhibiting the qualities that a system that guarantees 
independence presupposes?  These are questions judges must ask 
themselves.  For, unlike in the day of Trevett v. Weeden, judges need 
not say nothing to ensure that they may keep their job.  Rather, it 
is through the quality of what they do say in explaining the results 
they reach that they can best ensure that the independence that 
they have been given will endure.   
But, as my presence here today reflects, judges do not 
communicate with the public solely through their opinions.  And so, 
it is well to consider: how else may judges address the challenges to 
judicial independence that are evident?  One forum is near and dear 
to me, as someone who taught law for such a long time and who still 
does, and it is law schools.  The concern is that shifts in the political 
culture are conveying messages to students in law school that may 
have quite unfortunate impacts on the broader legal culture.  The 
concern is that a message is being conveyed that, in law, there are 
sides that loosely mirror the political sides, and that you better 
choose up early to have a legal career in government.  I know many 
judges and academics share this concern—that students, at an age 
when they should be developing their own independent voice when 
it comes to law and deciding for themselves the mix of positions that 
gives them confidence in the integrity of a legal position, may feel 
pressure to espouse a script, developed by others, for what “their” 
side believes about law and how to talk about it.  The judiciary, in 
response to this concern, has attempted to account for it.  The 
12  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
committee on judicial conduct recently offered guidance about the 
types of groups that federal judges may speak to and the 
conferences that they should attend.   
I know I have myself struggled with this issue.  I think it is an 
affirmatively good thing for students in law school to be so engaged 
with law and legal ideas that they choose to convene in groups like 
the American Constitution Society and the Federalist Society. 
Insofar as there are organizations that provide fora for engaging 
and learning and exploring ideas, they are wonderful institutions. 
Both before becoming a judge, and after, I have learned from events 
hosted by such groups, and I have seen them as affording important 
chances for me to help make the federal judiciary more visible and 
more knowable to those who care about it.  But insofar as students 
come to think of such organizations as professional markers of 
belief systems, and as places for learning scripts that they must 
become adept at reciting in order to advance professionally, then 
they are serving neither the purposes of legal education nor the 
cause of judicial independence.  And the worry is, for a host of 
reasons I will not attempt to catalog today, that too many students 
are coming to think of these organizations in this latter way.  For 
that reason, I have come to think that it is important that judges, 
when visiting law schools, do their best to encourage students in 
these groups to meet together rather than separately and to use the 
occasion to meet with them to express these concerns about the 
importance of students deciding things for themselves, on the 
merits so to speak.  
But, aside from that particular concern, there is also the 
broader one of how, more generally, to talk to the public about the 
challenge to judicial independence that one hears coming from 
many quarters.  There is no simple answer to that question from 
my perspective.  Federal judges, after all, are not always very well 
suited to press the case for their own neutrality.  There is the 
familiar concern about the effectiveness of protesting too much. 
There is also the concern that the defense of the independent-
mindedness of the judiciary will itself draw the judiciary into the 
political back and forth, thereby subtly eroding the sense of removal 
that is important for judges to maintain if they are to decide cases 
impartially.  But, as reflected in the Chief Justice’s recent public 
statement, silence has its risks, too.  The repeated assertion in 
public that decisions are not being made according to law—that 
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they are simply a reflection of the legal positions favored by either 
the party in power or the one out of it—can have its own effect in 
eroding the notion that judges decide their cases independently. 
Judges do not understand themselves to be deciding cases in the 
crude manner in which those decisions are sometimes assumed to 
have been decided.  They have an obligation to educate the public 
about that reality.  Is there an audience for that message?  I ask 
that in all sincerity.  I trust that you are such an audience, and that 
if you believe it, you will do your part to convey it.   
But, since I have you, let me close by just offering my own 
account of what, having now been a judge for five years, it feels like 
to be deciding independently in the hopes that it might give you 
some confidence that judicial independence is still an ideal worth 
aspiring to achieve.  I should confess that I certainly am in no 
position to suggest that it is inherently persuasive for judges to 
insist that they decide cases “according to law.”  Before becoming a 
judge, I taught law for nearly fifteen years.  As a law professor, I 
did not teach my students that there was nothing more to judicial 
decision making than figuring out the answer “according to law.”  I 
often categorized judges as liberal or conservative.  I emphasized 
the open-ended nature of so many controversies that judges are 
called upon to decide.  I might even have remarked upon the 
president who had appointed a given judge or made a prediction 
about how a court might rule based on such a fact.  Nor is it 
plausible to think of the mind of a judge as if it were a tabula rasa.  
No mind is.  We all come to the decisions that we have to make 
already prejudiced in a sense by the limits or breadth of our own 
experiences.  We are who we are.  But, I think, precisely for that 
reason, the way that judging looks to me now from the inside might 
give you some confidence that you are right to think judicial 
independence is important, that you are right to want to protect the 
independence of the judicial branch, and that you are right to expect 
that those people who have been appointed as federal judges will in 
fact decide their cases independently in the fullest sense of that 
word. 
So, to that end, I want to close by saying something about the 
transition from academic to judge that is a bit more personal and 
psychological—something, in other words, about what it feels like 
to be a judge and how it feels so different from being an academic. 
Academics have a lot of responsibility.  What they write can matter 
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a lot.  Sometimes more, in the long run, than what a court of appeals 
judge decides.  The impact a teacher can have on a student is also 
profound.  There are few endeavors that can rival teaching in the 
life-shaping impact that your own personal engagement with 
another human being might end up having.  But as a judge, you are 
immediately hit by the expectations that we invest in the role of the 
judge.  It is easy to lose sight of that in teaching. 
Much of teaching and academic writing, and law student 
discussion, is about demystifying the role of the judge, treating 
them as individuals, with biases, and ideologies, and goals, rather 
than as those who inhabit a role that long preceded them and that 
will long outlast them.  But, however much as an academic I might 
have written about judging in the former mode, when you become a 
judge, it is striking how quickly you become introduced to the still 
powerful hold that the idea of the judge as a very stable role, with 
a very stable set of expectations, still has in our society and our 
culture.  It is easy to mock the confirmation process for the rote 
answers it seems to generate from nominees about their 
commitment to decide cases on the facts and the law and not on the 
basis of their own views.  But if you ever have the experience of 
going through that process, I think you will find that there is a 
power in it.  I did.  
I think anyone who becomes a judge has to step back and think 
about the following question.  If I were in a dispute and the judge 
was going to decide whether the outcome of that dispute would be 
freedom or confinement, a vindication of a transfer of property or a 
denial of it, a recognition of a right or a rejection of it, and I did not 
know up front whether I would be hoping the decision would be for 
the judge to rule in favor of liberty or confinement, for the property 
transfer or not, for the right’s rejection or its embrace, what would 
I want that judge to be like?  I think you could not do much better 
than to fall back on some notion that you would want the person 
deciding your fate in that instance to be as open-minded as possible 
to the most persuasive arguments that could be brought to bear on 
the basis of all the materials that you—you!—would have a fair shot 
at presenting.  In other words, you would want that judge to be 
deciding that case on what we call the facts and the law: how else 
would you have a passing chance at being persuasive to that 
person? 
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For me, the confirmation process was in that regard a very 
powerful reconfirmation of something fundamental in the culture 
that is aspirational about who judges are and what they do, even if 
academics, quite understandably, are constantly pointing out all 
the ways it does not capture what judges actually do.  I don’t mean 
by saying this that judges are robots or computers or that they are 
all the same.  We know that is not true.  I do mean, though, that a 
judge is always both a person and a role.  No judge, I think, does 
the job without asking him or herself what another judge once 
asked me: do you ever wonder whether it matters that you are a 
judge as opposed to whether that there is a judge?  And yet, I think, 
no judge ever does—or should—think about the job as if the role is 
one that is defined by the person who inhabits the role (temporarily) 
of judge. 
The goal is to be faithful to that title, one that you did not 
invent and that was not created for you, any more than the role of 
teacher was invented by those who play that role.  Academics, like 
judges, are inheritors.  They are temporary custodians of a 
tradition.  They have no choice but to make that tradition their own, 
even as they honor it.  But the tradition is accorded respect and an 
important measure of autonomy whether we call it academic 
freedom and tenure or judicial independence and service during 
good behavior—because it is aiming at the expression of something 
free from the scripts of the moment that politics produces.  That is 
the job.  And it is one I am honored to have. 
